Wednesday, 3 April 2013

Provisional Programme




Understanding Value Programme Overview


Wednesday 17th July 2013
15:00
Registration
16:00
Plenary Session 1 (?)
17:30
Wine reception and (informal) dinner

Thursday 18th July 2013
09:00
Tea and Coffee
09:30
Well-Being
Epistemology 1
Intrinsic Value
11:00
Break
11:30
Raz and Autonomy
Aesthetics 1
Objective Value
13:00
Lunch
14:00
Emotion
Epistemology 2
Value and Kant
15:30
Break
16:00
Plenary Session 2 (?)
17:30
Pub trip and conference dinner

Friday 19th July 2013
09:00
Tea and Coffee
09:30
Moral Psychology
Aesthetics 2
Kant and Schopenhauer
11:00
Break
11:30
Value and Practical Reason
Epistemology 3
Metaethics
13:00
Lunch
14:00
Moral Philosophy
Subjective Value
Metaphysics of Value
15:30
Break
16:00
Plenary Session 3 (?)
17:30
Finish


Understanding Value Programme


Wednesday 17th July 2012
15:00
Registration
16:00
Plenary Session 1 (?)
‘-’
17:30
Wine reception and (informal) dinner




Thursday 18th July 2013
09:00
Tea and Coffee


09:30
Well-Being
Room 116; Chair:
Epistemology 1
Room 117; Chair:
Intrinsic Value
Room 215; Chair:
Value assumptions in happiness studies
Nora Heinzelmann
--
Epistemic Value and the Problem of Trivial Truths
Tamer Nawar
--
Moral status, intrinsic value and extrinsic properties
Nicolas Delon
Université de Picardie/CURAPP
Reformulating the Fitting-Pleasure theory of well-being
Joseph Carlsmith
University of Oxford
Epistemic Values and Epistemic Reasons
Christopher Cowie
--
The value of achievement
Hasko von Kriegsten
--
11:00
Break


11:30
Raz and Autonomy
Room 116; Chair:
Aesthetics 1
Room 117; Chair:
Objective Value
Room 215; Chair:
The Autonomy-Based Morality of Toleration
Armin Khameh
University of Sheffield
Expressing a Certain Vision: James, Collingwood and the Value of Aesthetic Activity David Collins
Ryerson University
McDowell, Value and the Absolute Conception of Reality
Thomas Whyman
--
Valuing Humanity: Raz, Korsgaard on the Ground of Respect
Chris Mills
University of Manchester
The Individual as Knowable by Love
Mark Hopwood
University of Chicago
On the possibility of objective values
Sander Werkhoven
--
13:00
Lunch


14:00
Emotion
Room 116; Chair:
Epistemology 2
Room 117; Chair:
Value and Kant
Room 215; Chair:
The Virtue of Modesty and Self-Evaluation
Sungwoo Um
--
Understanding the Epistemic Value of Testimony
Stephen Wright
University of Sheffield
Kant’s Chemical Method of Enquiry
Martin Sticker
--
Reconsidering Regret as Surrogate Value
Luke Brunning
--
Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable
James Andow
University of Nottingham
Practical Objectivity in Kantian Constructivism
Irina Schumski
--
15:30
Break


16:00
Plenary Session 2 (?)
‘-’
-
-
17:30
Pub trip and conference dinner



Friday 19th July 2013
09:00
Tea and Coffee


09:30
Moral Psychology
Room 116; Chair:
Aesthetics 2
Room 117; Chair:
Kant and Schopenhauer
Room 215; Chair:
Moral Error Theory, Metaphysical Naturalism and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons
Wouter Kalf
--
Aesthetic Judgements and Motivation
Alfred Archer
University of Edinburgh
Judging the Particular: Reflective Judgement Contemporary French Political Philosophy
Étienne Brown
--
An Evolutionary Vindication of Hutcheson’s Moral Sense Theory Rafe McGregor
--
Phenomenal Proximity and Value in Painting
Maria Forsberg
--
Preliminaries for an interpretation of Schopenhauer’s pessimism
David Woods
--
11:00
Break


11:30
Value and Practical Reason
Room 116; Chair:
Epistemology 3
Room 117; Chair:
Metaethics
Room 215; Chair:
Do situations in which morality conflicts with other kinds of serious value pose a problem for the status of morality?
Benjamin Nelmes
--
Epistemic Deontology and Two Kinds of Rules
Cameron Boult
--
Against Commitment
Alex Worsnip
Yale University

Can value unify normativity?
Stephen Ingram
University of Sheffield
Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge
Michael Hannon
University of Cambridge
Deliberating in the absence of value
Kian Mintz-Woo
--
13:00
Lunch


14:00
Moral Philosophy
Room 116; Chair:
Subjective Value
Room 117; Chair:
Metaphysics of Value
Room 215; Chair:
Constitutive Moral Luck and the Validity of our Moral Judgements
Chiara Felli
--
Value and hypothetical preferences
Fritz-Anton Fritzson
--
Defending the collapsing principle
Henrik Anderson
--
The Value of Supererogatory Actions
Claire Benn
--
Judging Valuable
Robbie Kubala
Columbia University
A new take on organic unities
Alain Pé-Curto
--
15:30
Break


16:00
Plenary Session 3 (?)
‘-‘
-
-
17:30
Finish



No comments:

Post a Comment